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Rio Grande do Sul was the first Brazilian state to plant genetically modified soybean. The sowing occurred in 1998 with 
Roundup Ready soybean seeds from Monsanto smuggled from Argentina. The aim of this study is to investigate how this 
innovative process of planting transgenic soybean came about in Rio Grande do Sul based on the actor network involved 
in the period 1998 to 2003. Although the innovative process has been discussed in the literature on innovation 
management since the work of Schumpeter, there is still no clear understanding of the issues of interests and power that 
involve the innovative process. Given this, from within the literature we have sought a perspective that would understand 
the innovative process as being political. We adopted Actor Network Theory as a base for the discussion of the primary 
and secondary data obtained regarding the controversy surrounding transgenic soybean in RS. The results point to the 
existence of two translation chains that contribute towards the formation of actor networks. 
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Introduction 
The literature on the generation and spread of innovations 
that was developed from the work of Schumpeter 
considers the firm the locus of innovation and responsible 
for economic and technological development. In order to 
occur, the innovative process, though internal to the firm, 
requires the presence of external elements. The study of 
the role of institutions in the innovative process originally 
focused on the science and technology systems (Freeman, 
1982) and was extended to the study of national systems 
of innovation (Freeman & Soete, 1997; Nelson & 
Rosenberg, 1993; Lundvall, 1999). Hence, the innovative 
process is understood to occur in a defined and mutant 
social space.  
Within this social space, the relationships established 
between the actors involve economic, political, scientific, 
historical, ecological and cultural issues that represent the 
full complexity of the environment in which the 
innovations are generated and diffused. As Dosi, Levinthal 
and Marengo (2000) said, the traditional literature on 
innovation management ignores issues such as incentives 
and power that influence the innovative processes. In 
addition, as pointed out by Lundvall, et al. (2002), up to 
now, the concept of a national system of innovation has 
failed to fully explain the interaction between the diverse 
external and internal elements of the firm and no studies 
have been developed into the influence of issues of power 
on the innovative process (Lundvall, 1999; Lundvall, et al. 
2002).  
The complexity of the context within which the innovative 
process occurs involves innumerous actors whose 
relationships produce specific local conditions that are 
important when attempting to understand the generation 
and spread of innovations.  This becomes even more 
important when this context is located in developing 
countries, like Brazil, with a history of technological 
dependence that has influenced its process of development 
(Furtado, 2008). We begin with a case study of the 
transgenic soybean in Rio Grande do Sul (RS), Brazil and 
study the relationships existing between the actors and 
their influence on the innovative process. We chose this 
case because it had local, national and international 
repercussions, as it was fundamental in defining the legal 
framework regarding genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in Brazil, as well as having economic effects, since 
the country is the second largest exporter of soybean in 
the world. Therefore, the question guiding this study is: 
Considering the network of actors involved, how 
did the innovative process related to transgenic 
soybean take place within Rio Grande do Sul?  
To answer this question, we procured a literature capable 
of aiding the understanding of the specificities of the case 
of transgenic soybean in RS, such as the smuggling of the 
seeds, the technological dependence in relation to the 
development of the transgenic seeds and the political 
discourse adopted by the actors involved. It was decided 
to use an approach based on Actor Network Theory, with 
the aim of offering a perspective that deals with the actors 
not only as economic, but also as political, social, historical 
and environmental agents so as to understand the 
innovative process that occurred in RS and its 
consequences with regard legislation and the GMO market 
in Brazil.   
Method 
The guiding principles of this study are: 
• The actors are engaged in controversies that 
define the course of action. 
• The actors are, in reality network-actors, since 
they do not act alone.  
• The actor network is not previously established, it 
is constructed by the actors that interfere in the 
course of the action. Hence, the network is the 
result of the analysis. 
• The network-actors may defend different 
perspectives, so constituting other networks that 
are intertwined and contribute towards the 
development of controversy.   
In order to put these principles into operation, the key-
category considered in the analysis is controversy. 
The controversy over GMOs was chosen because it 
involves new ethical issues regarding their creation, 
development on an industrial scale and marketing. 
Transgenic soybean, in turn, is inserted in a complex mesh 
of relationships of production and marketing, which 
construct the nature-culture collective both locally and 
globally.  
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In an attempt to obtain a multi-voice understanding of the 
subject, the materials listed below were chosen for 
analysis:  
• Scientific articles and books: The articles and 
books were selected because the represent examples of 
texts in favor and against the sowing and consumption of 
GMOs.  
• Legislation: Since 1995 there have been laws that deal 
with research into GMOs and their testing and marketing.   
• Sites of actors involved in the controversy: 
Research into the sites of actors was carried through 
Google using the expressions: transgenic soybean, 
transgenic soybean in the RS and Roundup Ready soybean, 
and other sources that they mentioned, constituting a set 
of local, national and international actors. Some of these 
sites were previously selected, other were encountered 
during the course of the field work, especially with the use 
of the mapping software Issue Crawler.   
• News reports: The two main newspapers from Rio 
Grande do Sul are the Correio do Povo and Jornal Zero Hora 
(ZH) According to Heberlê (2005) the Correio do Povo 
offers quite short news reports. Hence, priority was given 
to the reports in the supplement Campo & Lavoura (Field & 
Crop) in Jornal Zero Hora, since ZH often includes the 
voice of the interviewees, so providing a better 
understanding of the context in which they were given. 
The news reports used cover the period from February 
1998 (chosen because it was the first report of the illegal 
sowing of transgenic soybean in RS and is considered the 
spark behind the controversy as it brought the issue to 
public awareness) until 31/12/2003, the year in which the 
first Provisionary Measure (PM) was issued allowing the 
trading of the transgenic crop.  
• Individual Interviews: The interviews were held in 
March and April of 2007 with researchers working with 
transgenic soybean. We gave priority to the researchers 
(for and against GMOs), due to the central role of these 
professionals in the construction of scientific fact. The 
interviewees were: a researcher from State Environmental 
Protection Agency (Fundação Estadual de Proteção Ambiental 
- FEPAM) and the Zoo-botanical Foundation of RS, a 
professor and researcher form the Genetics Department 
of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) 
and a professor and researcher from the School of 
Agronomy at UFRGS. The researchers are recognized in 
the scientific community, as well as acting to raise 
awareness of GMOs within society. Besides identifying the 
world view, position and trajectory of these researchers, 
the interviews were intended to identify actors that 
supported and opposed them during the controversy, so 
extending the possibilities of investigation into the 
construction of the network.  
Following the above set of principles and data sources, 
blow we present the constitution of the transgenic 
soybean actor network in RS in the period from 1998 to 
2003. 
Results 
To better understand the formation of the network in the 
controversy surrounding the transgenic soybean in RS, the 
main actors involved are in introduced, with emphasis on 
their positions and influence so as to characterize their 
role during the course of the controversy.  
The transgenic soybean sown in RS 
The deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) recombination 
technique led to the first Genetically Modified Organism 
(GMO) in the 1980s, human genes were added to E. Colli in 
order to produce insulin (Mortari, 2006). In 1988, two 
articles were published in Nature Biotechnology on the 
production of transgenic soybean: Production of transgenic 
soybean plants using Agrobacterium-mediated DNA transfer 
(Hinchee, et al. 1988) and Stable transformation of soybean 
(Glycine max) by particle acceleration (McCabe, et al. 1988). 
As from 1988, companies began to patent their techniques: 
Monsanto - Agrobacterium, Agracetus – particle 
acceleration and DuPont - direct gene transfer.  
In 1996, Monsanto became the first company to put 
soybean seeds, Roundup Ready soybean (RR), which is 
resistant to glyphosate on the market. The RR soybean 
seeds were mainly sown in the USA and later sold to other 
countries between, among them Argentina, one of the 
three biggest soybean producers in the world. At that 
time, Monsanto had seeds undergoing testing in research 
fields located in RS. Other research centers, like the 
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Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisas Agropecuárias (Embrapa) and 
biotechnology laboratories at UFRGS were also making 
strides in the genetic manipulation of vegetable species 
using non-traditional methods.   
Soybean occupies the second position in terms of global 
market value of grains (almost 3 billion dollars), and Brazil 
is the second largest producer (around 60 million tons) 
after the USA (around 87 million tons). In 1997, 6 
countries grew genetically modified plants:  the USA, 
China, Canada, Australia and Mexico. The area planted 
with has increased at around 13% per year, surpassing 100 
million hectares in 22 countries (James, 2006). 
Rio Grande do Sul was the first state in Brazil to plant 
genetically modified soybean (Sousa Jr. 2006). The 
transgenic soybean planted in RS is RR soybean, the 
property rights of which belong to Monsanto. Besides the 
RR soybean seed, Monsanto also sells the glyphosate-based 
herbicide.    
The soybean farmers 
In February 1998, the first reports appeared in the press 
that transgenic soybean, using RR seeds smuggled from 
Argentina, was being sown in the north of RS. The planted 
area was believed to be 7.500 hectares (ZH, 05/02/1998). 
This fact sparked the transgenic soybean controversy in 
RS, because it brought the illegal sowing of transgenic 
seeds to the attention of the public.  
The farmers justified sowing the crop by saying they 
believed that the transgenic seed offered higher 
productivity and reduced production costs, especially 
because less herbicide would be needed.  Through their 
representative entities, they organized demonstrations in 
the north and center of RS, which brought together 
hundreds of farmers with their tractors calling for freedom 
of choice for their plantations:  transgenic, conventional or 
organic (ZH, 12/03/2002), as a means of pressuring for a 
lifting of the ban on the cultivation of RR soybean.   
However, not all the farmers followed the same path. At 
the 10th National Soybean Forum, held in Porto Alegre, the 
purchasing director of a French cooperative - Coopèrative 
Agricole Noelle Artemis – said that the French would buy 
conventional soybean if its price was no more than 5% 
higher than the market value and the traceability of the 
product was guaranteed (ZH, 04/05/1999). With a view to 
meet the demand from this market, the Cooperativa 
Agropecuária do Alto Uruguai Ltda. (Cotrimaio) created the 
non-genetically modified soybean program and organic 
production program, the traceability of which met 
European standards.  From 1998 to 2006, Cotrimaio 
increased its revenue fourfold, becoming the second 
largest agricultural cooperative in RS.  
Monsanto 
The soybean seed market is dominated by multinational 
companies and has been undergoing a process of 
concentration, especially with the commercialization of 
transgenic soybean. In the period from 1995 to 1998, 
around 50 acquisitions and mergers were recorded, 
reaching a value of US$17 billion. Other forms of contract 
and joint ventures reached a value of US$13 billion in the 
same period (James, 1998). Monsanto was involved in 
more acquisitions and alliances than any other company. 
The first company to be acquired by Monsanto was 
Agracetus. Another acquired company was Asgrow Seeds, 
with which Monsanto jointly developed Roundup Ready 
soybean, which is resistant to glyphosate. By acquiring 
these two companies, Monsanto ensured the technological 
domination necessary for the production of transgenic 
seeds. With this process of concentration Monsanto 
became the largest seed company in the world.   In Brazil, 
Monsanto acquired Agroceres, the largest Brazilian corn 
seed company, with 30% of the market (Kleba, 1998).   
In June 1998, Monsanto formally requested the commercial 
release of RR soybean before the National Technical 
Commission on Biosafety (CTNBio). Until the CTNBio 
granted the commercial release in September, Monsanto 
appeared to be a somewhat neglectful actor in the 
controversy. With the exception of possible accusations 
made by the Federal Police in relation to the illegal 
plantation of RR soybean and the possible hiring of a firm 
of private, Monsanto was rarely mentioned and apparently 
inactive before the general public, with few statements 
from its Regulation Director regarding the accusations in 
the case of illegal dissemination of seeds (ZH, 06/02/1998). 
This changed radically with the release of RR soybean.  
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Soon after the commercial release, the ZH supplement 
Caderno Campo & Lavoura published a two-page interview 
with a representative of Monsanto (the name of the 
interviewee was not given), the title of which was Uma 
supersafra de dúvidas ( "a bumper harvest of uncertainty) 
(ZH, 02/10/1998). In this interview, Monsanto answered 
questions from the soybean farmers regarding productivity, 
the use of herbicide, environmental and health problems, 
monopoly formation, the market for transgenic crops, 
prices and costs, and the commercial launch of the RR 
seed. Monsanto strongly recommended that the farmers 
should not store seeds for the next sowing, in order to 
avoid a drop in productivity. In order to deny all possible 
problems, the CTNBio report was cited several times in 
the text. This discourse was in direct response to the 
arguments of some researchers and agronomists that there 
were no conclusive tests available on the effects of 
transgenic soybean on health and the environment. The 
manifestations from Monsanto were based on the technical 
report from the CTNBio, and were intended to dissipate 
the doubts raised by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) regarding the data presented.  
In 2003, after the permission for the sowing and 
commercialization of RR soybean was granted, Monsanto 
began to charge royalties. As royalties can only be charged 
upon presentation of a legal invoice for the sale of the 
seeds, in this case their collection was unfeasible since the 
seeds were illegal. Nevertheless, the farmers’ 
representatives and Monsanto entered into an agreement 
in RS: Instead of paying royalties on the seed, the farmers 
would pay on the harvest.   
The governmental actors 
Due to pressure from the farmers and their associations in 
RS, the governmental actors were very active during the 
analyzed period of the controversy. At the Federal level, 
debates were centered in the ministries and in the 
CTNBio.   
• National Technical Commission for Biosafety – 
CTNBio 
The CTNBio was created in 1995 by the Law nr 8.974 
(Biosafety Law). Its purpose is to provide technical and, 
support and advice to the federal government on the 
formulation and implementation of the National Biosafety 
Policy in relation to GMOs, as well as establish guidelines 
and reports for the construction, experimentation, 
cultivation, manipulation, transport, commercialization, 
consumption, storage release and disposal of GMOs and 
their derivatives. The CTNBio is composed of 27 
members, with 9 representatives from ministries and the 
remaining specialists from different areas of knowledge 
related to biotechnology (CTNBio 2009). 
At the beginning of 1998, when the RR soybean was being 
planted, the law only allowed the plating of GMOs for the 
purposes of research and controlled tests.  Therefore, 
both the smuggling of RR soybean seeds and their sowing 
were illegal in Brazil according to the Biosafety Law. 
However, the property rights of Monsanto over RR 
soybean were guaranteed by Law 9.456, 25/04/1997 
(Cultivar Protection Law).  In the case the ban on planting 
GMOs was lifted, the sowing of RR soybean would involve 
paying royalties to Monsanto.  
On the occasion of the request made by Monsanto to lift 
the ban on the commercialization of RR soybean, the 
Federal Court in São Paulo conceded an injunction 
suspending the cultivation of RR soybean in the absence of 
environmental impact studies in response to requests 
made by the Consumer Defense Institute (Instituto de 
Defesa do Consumidor - IDEC) and environmental groups, 
among them Greenpeace. In September 1998, the CTNBio 
approved the release of RR soybean without the need for 
environmental impact studies conducted by an 
independent entity, and accepted the results presented by 
Monsanto in reference to the USA. However, the sowing 
was still to able to reverse the judicial actions.  
• The ministries 
The most active ministries in this controversy around the 
RR soybean were the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia- MCT) and the Ministry of 
the Environment (Ministério do Meio Ambiente - MMA). 
They found themselves on opposite sides of the debate. 
The MCT took a position in defense of biotechnology and 
the GMOs, since they are seen as representing economic 
and technological development for the country, as a 
biotechnology policy was necessary in order to permit the 
insertion of Brazil in such a promising field of knowledge. 
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For the Ministry of Science and Technology: “ – When the 
evaluation of scientists came to be contested by consumers and 
environmentalists, we were confronted by an attack on science 
itself. We faced a new obscurantism” (ZH, 22/07/1999). For 
its part, the MMA, were opposed to the GMOs, and 
focused on the need for more studies. With regard 
biosafety and the legislation, the MMA followed the 
Precautionary Principle and open access information policy 
(MMA, 2007).    
The confrontation between the two ministries continued 
in the following years due to the discussion about the 
reformulation of the Biosafety Law in 2003. The MMA 
proposed 15 vetoes to the bill based on unconstitutionality 
and the public interest (MMA/Consultoria Jurídica, 2005), 
with only two being accepted in relation to length of time 
available for the assessment of the processes submitted to 
the CTNBio (Home Office – Undersecretary for Legal 
Affairs (Casa Civil/Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos, 2005)).  
• Legislative Assembly of RS and the State 
Secretariats. 
The Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperativism Commission 
of the Legislative Assembly argued that, in the case that 
commercial plantations of transgenic soybean existed in 
RS, they should be preserved and the harvest 
commercialized, since the farmers could be the victims of 
smuggling and should not have to suffer with the loss of 
the harvest, or, in the words of the president of the 
Commission: “That’s why the onus should not be met by the 
farmer, who seeks to reduce the cost of production”(ZH, 
19/02/1998).   
In January 1999, with the election of Olivio Dutra, the 
Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) assumed the 
government of RS, while also increasing its share of seats 
in the Legislative Assembly. After this, a state deputy with 
the backing of the Secretary for Agriculture presented a 
bill intended to impede the cultivation and sale of GMOs, 
and so make RS into a “State free of transgenics”. The 
justification for the law was grounded in the uncertainty 
regarding the effects of transgenic crops on the 
environment and health, as well as the possibility of 
obtaining economic gains with the sale of conventional 
soybean to the European Union.  This position was a relief 
to the pro-family farming movement in the RS, which had 
re-emerged in the 1970s and struggled for the autonomy 
of the small rural producer.  
With the election of the Governor Germano Rigotto in 
2003, the government of RS assumed a pro-transgenics 
position. According to Germano Rigotto: “- There is 
transgenic soybean in every producer State. If an illegal situation 
exists, then all such States are in that situation, not just Rio 
Grande do Sul.” (ZH, 09/03/2003). Hence, the state 
government assumed that the cultivation of RR soybean 
was inevitable.  
• The Presidency of the Republic 
In 2003 the mandate of Lula in the Federal Government 
began. During the presidential campaign Lula's team 
proposed a ban on the cultivation of transgenic soybean, 
since there was a market for conventional soybean, which 
was understood as a differentiated product. However, in 
March the first provisional measure (PM) was issued for 
the commercialization of the transgenic soybean crop, due 
to the great pressure from farmers’ representatives. PM 
113 authorized the commercialization of the crop that had 
been harvested in that period and determined the 
destruction of transgenic grains and seeds by the end of 
2004.   
In 26/09/2003, the government issued PM 131 on the lifting 
on the ban on the sowing of modified soybean seeds in the 
harvest 03/04 for those farmers that had seeds in stock. 
PM 131 required that farmers who planted RR soybean in 
the 03/04 sign a Term of Commitment, Responsibility and 
Adjustment of Conduct. The document provoked heated 
debate in the National Congress, as some members alleged 
that it treated the farmers with transgenic seeds as 
criminals. Furthermore, they argued that inspection would 
be impossible (ZH, 26/09/2003). The term contained a 
section in which the signee declared that he was aware of 
the illegal nature of the crop. This PM practically closed 
the controversy regarding RR soybean, since the farmers 
felt they were free to plant the transgenic seeds and 
demanded successive Provisionary Measures for the 
commercialization of the transgenic crops and the 
Monsanto began to charge royalties.   
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Researchers and research institutes 
• Embrapa 
Since the 1970s, the Brazilian Agricultural and Livestock 
Research Company (Empresa Brasileira Pesquisa 
Agropecuárias - Embrapa) has acted in the adaption of 
soybean varieties to Brazilian climatic and geographical 
conditions, having produced significant results at the end of 
the 1980s (Embrapa Soja, 2003). In the 1990s, Embrapa, 
lacking sufficient logistical, financial and human resources 
to meet the needs of the national productive sector, 
created the Embrapa Partnership System. To begin with, 
partnerships with public research institutions were 
prioritized. Later, partnerships were also established with 
the private sector, especially representatives of the seed 
industry.  The agreements allowed for the participation of 
Embrapa’s partners in the rights to the cultivars generated 
as a result of joint research programs, which also implied 
the rights to multiply, commercialize and earn royalties 
(Miranda, 2005).    
At the end of the 1990s, Embrapa adopted a market 
oriented position, inline with the national interests 
regarding property rights over genetic material, in order to 
protect the genetic material developed in its research 
centers. Embrapa is placed in 4th place in the market of 
soybean cultivar ownership. In 1998, the president of 
Embrapa expounded a pro-transgenic position at the 
largest agricultural fair in the South of Brazil, confirming 
the existence of a partnership with Monsanto to develop 
genetically modified soybean seeds.   
• Researchers  
In order to express the positions of the researchers 
involved with GMOs we present some studies 
recommended by the interviewed researchers.  In 2006, 
the International Service for the Acquisition of Agro-
biotech Applications (ISAAA) issued a report highlighting 
the benefits of planting transgenic crops, which considered 
data from 1997 to 2005 (Brookes & Barfoot, 2006). The 
advantages identified are higher productivity, reduced costs 
and lower consumption of herbicides. The report from the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2003) states that the 
benefits for developing countries may be greater than 
those for developed countries.  GMOs represent a 
possible solution to the problems of high rates of poverty 
and the unsatisfactory state of health and of agricultural 
sustainability, because of the possibility of generating higher 
income and reducing environmental impacts. Hence, the 
cultivation of form would bring benefits for the 
environment due to the reduction in the use of pesticides, 
guarantee food security and, furthermore reduce 
production costs.   
However, pro-transgenic studies are countered by a series 
of others that cast doubt on the results obtained, and call 
for direct studies with soybean and not with other plants 
and bring new data and new interpretations (Nodari & 
Guerra, 2000, Patel, et al. 2005, Kleba, 1998, Pelaez, et al. 
2004; Watanabe & Nutti, 2002). The studies that are 
opposed to the GMOs highlight the importance of the 
risks to health and the environment, and question the cost 
reduction obtained with GMOs, as well as the research 
strategies that undervalue other forms of agriculture such 
as agroecology. Moreover they question the role of 
Monsanto in the dissemination of transgenic crops.  
The interviewed researchers, besides carrying out research 
with GMOs were very active in the controversy regarding 
RR soybean. They took part in debates organized 
throughout RS in universities, unions, associations, on 
radio, television and in the Legislative Assembly, so 
popularizing the scientific knowledge about GMOs and the 
RR soybean.  
 Both the Genetic researcher and the Agronomy 
researcher from UFRGS work in the development of 
transgenic seeds. The geneticist’s research group uses the 
gas particle acceleration technique.   There is no need for 
the payment of royalties since an American professor 
made a drawing of the particle accelerator that was passed 
on to the researcher and built in the Physics Department 
of UFRGS.  However, her concern in relation to royalties 
is with the gene used in the research: The most recent 
work of the group uses the Bt gene, which is resistant to 
insects. This gene was modified by a Canadian professor 
and the Brazilian researcher, in conversation with the 
professor, negotiated transfer term that allows the group 
to carry out research with the gene without paying 
royalties.  Furthermore she believes it is of utmost 
importance to carry out research with transgenic soybean 
and remain autonomous in relation to the multinationals: “I 
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hear: - You are a competitor of Monsanto! I say: Yes, I am! It is 
extremely important! (…) We’re not going to be dependent on 
multinationals to develop our research.” 
The discourse of the researcher from Agronomy follows a 
similar line: "[The multinationals work in large cultures that 
have large markets, And in the tropics, what do they do? This is 
the chance for us to work on things of interest to the Brazilian 
people. I have always defended biotechnology in this.” The 
interviewee is part of a research group that has patents for 
varieties of transgenic oats, and the main variety of oats 
planted in Argentina is produced by the group.  
The researcher from the FZB, who holds an anti-
transgenic position, defends an attitude she refers to as 
ethical in relation to GMOs and their effects on the 
environment and human beings: “I don’t want to be a guinea 
pig”. For this, she bases here position on scientific studies 
whose results cast doubt on the advantages of transgenics. 
When questioned about the debate on the pros and 
contras of transgenics, the geneticist states that: “in the 
beginning, what we wanted was to place one against and one in 
favor. So I argued with members of landless groups, land 
squatters, with environmentalists. It was terrible, because we 
are not speaking the same language!”  The two researchers 
from UFRGS stated they began to avoid participating in 
public debates, a frequent quote from both of them being 
“it’s a waste of time”. On the other hand, the interviewee 
from the FZB claimed that the pro-transgenic actors 
abandoned the dispute out of fear of losing and because 
they were unable to present research results that prove 
transgenics do no harm to health or the environment.  
Moreover, she classified the pro-transgenic position as 
ideological and directed towards the interests of the 
multinationals. The researchers from UFRGS used similar 
arguments.  For them, the discourse against transgenics has 
no scientific base.  In the words of the professor from 
Agronomy: “what happened at that time continues to happen 
now: the scientific debate is abandoned in favor of an 
ideological one.”  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) against 
RR soybean.  
These organizations were active throughout the 
controversy, especially at demonstrations and in legal 
processes aimed at impeding the lift on the ban of RR 
soybean.  The most active NGO was Greenpeace, which 
was responsible for demonstrations in RS an in Brasilia on 
the event of CTNBio meetings. Greenpeace acted 
together with the Consumer Defense Institute to file a 
public civil action that impeded the planting of RR soybean 
even with the favorable report from the CTNBio.   
Another organization that actively participated in the 
controversy was the Landless Workers Movement (MST).  
One of the most important episodes in the controversy 
happened during the World Social Forum in 2001, held in 
Porto Alegre, RS. During the Forum, members of the MST 
and the French farmer José Bové took part in the 
destruction of 2 hectares of corn and soybean belonging to 
Monsanto in RS (ZH, 20/01/2001).  
Discussion 
As stated in the Introduction, in order to understand the 
innovative process a being political and influenced by 
vested interests and power relations, Actor Network 
Theory was used as a base for the discussion.   
The actors introduced herein correspond to what Latour 
(2006) calls obligatory passage points, that is, indispensible 
actors that are converted to obligatory quotations or 
essential laboratories in the unfolding controversy. These 
actors are fundamental for the definition of the paths of 
the innovative process, since they need to be mentioned 
by other actors when they adopt a position in relation to 
the controversy (Law, 1986). Therefore, the obligatory 
points of passage define translation chains that link the 
innovation produced in the laboratory, in this case the RR 
soybean, to the market and society.   
Callon, et al. (2001) claim that the constitution and 
functioning of the networks can be understood by 
analyzing the translation operation. The translation is the 
interpretation given by those that construct the scientific 
facts – soybean – from their interests and from those 
people that they recruit (Latour, 2005). Each obligatory 
point of passage has a set of allies that support its 
interpretation and help from the network within which the 
controversy occurs. Since they do not act alone, the actors 
can be understood as network-actors (Latour, 2006). 
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When analyzing the positions adopted by the actors in the 
case of RR soybean in RS, innumerable translation chains 
can be seen supported by different actors that define the 
result of the innovative process, that is, the release for 
planting and commercialization of the RR soybean. The 
strongest translation chain within the network is that 
which allies the development of research, planting and 
commercialization of RR soybean and the other GMOs to 
the technological and economic development of the 
country. This chain is expressed in the discourses of the 
farmers that to planted RR soybean illegally, given that they 
use arguments involving the increase in productivity and 
the reduction in production costs as justifications for 
sowing the crop. Besides the farmers, the reports from 
ISAAA and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and 
Monsanto highlight not only the economic gains, but also 
the environmental conservation resulting from the 
reduction in the use of herbicides provided by RR soybean. 
The interviewed UFRGS researchers also supported this 
discourse, as well as introducing the issue of the mastery 
of genetic engineering techniques as a form of ensuring the 
technological competitiveness of the country. To these 
actors, it is possible to add the MCT and the government 
of RS during the office of Germano Rigotto. The latter, 
moreover, provided a discourse suggesting the inevitability 
of the planting of RR soybean, not only in RS, but also in 
other Brazilian states. Hence, RR soybean from Monsanto 
is converted into technological and economic development 
and environmental conservation for the country.  Although 
this translation chain became hegemonic, it was not the 
only one to form the network. 
In the midst of this chain an interesting point emerges: The 
Genetic researcher avoided paying royalties by means of 
direct and, in some cases, informal contacts with 
researchers from developed countries.  Here it is possible 
to see another form of mobilization of allies for the 
constitution of obligatory points of passage. Latour makes 
no comment regarding this form. It constitutes an informal 
manner that the researchers have available to influence the 
course of action. The translation of interests is made by 
both the Genetics researcher from UFRGS, to whom the 
free drawing of the gas acceleration equipment was of 
interest, and the American professor for whom the 
dissemination of his work was of interest, since, in this way 
he would be able to acquire greater prestige. Perhaps this 
might be one of the ways that Brazilian researchers find to 
carry out their studies given the difficulties involved in 
doing such research in Brazil, be it due to the scarcity of 
funding and/or the limited research infrastructure of the 
universities that helps generate a scenario of technological 
dependence, especially in high technology sectors.  
The NGOs, the studies that question the advantages of the 
GMOs and demand specific studies with soybean, the 
government of the RS under the direction of Olivio Dutra, 
the MMA and the interviewed researcher put forward an 
environmental/health discourse against transgenics that 
questions the risks and uncertainties in relation to the 
planting and consumption of RR soybean. These actors, at 
the end of the controversy, stopped being obligatory 
points of passage, given that these actors remained in a 
subordinate position in the relationships of power 
established in the network.  Nevertheless, that does not 
mean that they were not fundamental for the controversy. 
An example of their importance can be seen by the fact 
that the ban on the planting and commercialization of RR 
soybean was only lifted by means of a Provisionary 
Measure in 2003, though the CNTBio had had approved its 
release in 1998. Another example of the importance of 
these actors was the organization of programs for 
conventional and organic soybean with the traceability of 
Cotrimaio. Even following market logic, the growth of 
Cotrimaio based on these programs demonstrated that 
transgenic soybean was not inevitable and that profitability 
and economic development can come from alternative 
sources.  
These two main chains constitute the actor network of 
transgenic soybean in RS within which the controversy 
occurred. At first sight, each one of the chains appears to 
constitute a fixed and well defined network. However, the 
network is only constituted through the relationships 
(Descola, 2005) and thee relationships are movable (Calás 
& Smircich, 1999), altering the position of the actors in the 
network.  The network can only be understood as a whole 
or, as Law (2000) puts it, the network exploits 
relationships and, for this reason each actor can only be 
understood in terms of their relationships with the others. 
Hence, no network-actor can be understood as fixed. That 
is why, Latour (1997, 2004, 2005, 2006) and Löwy (2005) 
say that in order to understand the network it is necessary 
to follow the researchers while they develop their work, 
since it is from the generation of an innovation in the 
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laboratory that the allies become mobilized, involving not 
only the scientists, but also profanes who are called to 
participate during the innovative process. In the case of RR 
soybean, the participation of the profanes occurred 
especially in the diffusion of the innovation, given that it 
was not produced in RS. Nevertheless, this participation 
and the constitution of the actor network support the 
view that the innovative process is a political process that 
goes beyond economic issues. 
Hence, we believe that this study represents a contribution 
towards the understanding of the generation and spread of 
innovations as a political process that involves making 
choices between different world views and the defense of 
interests of actors that mobilize allies in order to 
strengthen themselves sufficiently to point of being able to 
influence the path of the controversy.   
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